Emancitopia

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes wrote Leviathan (1651) amid the tumultuous English Civil War (1642-1651), a period that profoundly shaped his political philosophy. Having witnessed Parliament’s rebellion against Charles I, the king’s execution in 1649, and the collapse of traditional authority, Hobbes experienced firsthand the chaos that ensues when sovereign power disintegrates. The war claimed an estimated 200,000 English lives—nearly 4% of the population—as competing claims to authority tore the social fabric apart. From exile in France after 1640, Hobbes observed how the absence of undisputed sovereign power plunged his homeland into what he would later characterize as a “state of nature”—a war of all against all. This historical context drove his conviction that security requires surrendering natural liberty to an absolute sovereign.

Today, as I examine how Hobbes’s premises about natural human freedom, equality, and rights play out in his political theory, I find myself in comparable circumstances. My hometown Tehran is experiencing Israeli airstrikes that began on June 13, 2025 with “Operation Rising Lion,” involving approximately 200 fighter jets striking over 100 targets across Iran (CBS News, 2025a). By June 16, Iranian officials reported 224 casualties (Washington Post, 2025), while Israel’s Defense Forces issued evacuation warnings through social media, urging residents of northeastern Tehran to “immediately leave” targeted zones (Associated Press, 2025). Meanwhile, Iran has launched counterattacks with over 370 missiles and drones toward Israeli cities, causing 24 civilian deaths (Reuters, 2025b), and imposed nationwide internet restrictions (Anadolu Agency, 2025).

This scenario—where states claim defensive necessity while civilians navigate between sovereign commands and self-preservation—exemplifies the theoretical tension at the heart of Hobbes’s political philosophy: the paradoxical relationship between natural rights and sovereign authority during conflict.

THESIS STATEMENT: Hobbes’s political philosophy begins with the premise that humans are naturally free, equal, and possess certain natural rights. This essay demonstrates how these premises generate a fundamental paradox: the very rights that define our humanity must be largely surrendered to secure their minimal protection. This paradoxical transformation has profound implications for civilian rights and state responsibilities during armed conflict, where the sovereign’s duty of protection confronts the inalienable right to self-preservation.

Natural Equality, Freedom, and the State of Nature

Hobbes grounds his political theory in three radical premises about human nature. First, he asserts fundamental human equality, stating in Chapter XIII of Leviathan: “Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind… the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend.” This equality is not a moral ideal but a factual condition where even “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest”—a revolutionary claim in the hierarchical 17th century.

From this equality emerges his second premise of natural freedom, defined as “the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature.” In this condition, humans possess unlimited freedom to use any means necessary for self-preservation—where “every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body.”

Hobbes’s third premise follows: this combination of equality and freedom produces an inherently unstable situation—a war of all against all emerging from “three principall causes of quarrel”: competition for gain, diffidence for safety, and glory for reputation. Life in this state of nature is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”

The result is a profound paradox: the unlimited natural right to self-preservation creates conditions where effective self-preservation becomes impossible. When everyone has the right to everything, no one can secure anything. This contradiction drives Hobbes’s political theory toward its resolution in sovereign authority.

The Social Contract and Sovereign Authority

Hobbes proposes the social contract as the rational solution to this paradox. Through covenant, individuals authorize a sovereign power, transferring much of their natural right in exchange for collective security: “The only way to erect such a Common Power… is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men… This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man.”

This covenant transforms natural rights into civil rights: the unlimited natural right to self-preservation becomes a limited civil right to protection by the sovereign. Natural rights are not eliminated but transformed through the social contract.

However, Hobbes introduces a crucial limitation: certain rights cannot be transferred, particularly “the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life.” This retention of the fundamental right to self-preservation creates a permanent tension in Hobbes’s political theory.

The sovereign’s authority derives directly from the natural rights surrendered by subjects. Through authorization, subjects become “Authors” of the sovereign’s actions, with the sovereign as “Actor.” This creates a powerful justification for sovereign authority while establishing its purpose: not arbitrary dominion but protection. As Hobbes states, “The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.” When sovereign protection fails, aspects of natural rights necessarily reemerge: “The right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished.” This creates a dynamic relationship where rights transform according to the level of protection provided, establishing limits on sovereign authority derived directly from Hobbes’s premises about natural rights.

Civilian Rights and State Responsibilities During Armed Conflict

Hobbes’s premises establish several civilian rights during armed conflict that remain despite the social contract. Most fundamentally, subjects never relinquish the core right to self-preservation when directly threatened: “A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.”

This establishes five specific civilian rights during warfare:

1. The right to self-defense against imminent death: “If the Soveraign command a man… to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him… yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.”
2. The right to survival necessities: Civilians cannot be obligated “to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live.”
3. The right to flight from danger: Since no one can transfer their right to self-preservation, civilians retain the right to flee combat zones.
4. The right to seek alternative protection: When sovereign protection fails utterly, subjects may legitimately seek protection elsewhere.
5. The right to exemption from certain military duties: Hobbes acknowledges that natural “timorousnesse” exempts some from dangerous service.

These rights derive directly from Hobbes’s premise that certain natural rights—particularly self-preservation—remain inalienable even within civil society. Importantly, these rights expand or contract based on the level of protection the sovereign provides.

Correspondingly, the sovereign bears five crucial responsibilities during armed conflict:

1. The primary duty of civilian protection: The sovereign’s fundamental responsibility is to protect its subjects—the very purpose for which sovereignty was established.
2. Proportionate use of risk: While sovereigns may legitimately risk subjects’ lives in defense of the commonwealth, such risk must be proportionate and necessary.
3. Prohibition against arbitrary sacrifice: Sovereigns cannot legitimately sacrifice citizens for purposes unrelated to common defense.
4. Duty to provide survival necessities: The sovereign must ensure civilians have access to survival necessities during conflict.
5. Responsibility to warn civilians of danger: The sovereign must warn civilians of imminent dangers whenever possible.

The sovereign’s legitimacy depends on fulfilling these protective functions—when it fails to do so, the very basis of its authority is undermined. This understanding reframes the apparent absolutism of Hobbes’s sovereign. While the sovereign holds tremendous power, that power is fundamentally constrained by its purpose—protection. When the sovereign fails to provide protection, the corresponding obligation to obey diminishes proportionally, and aspects of natural rights necessarily reemerge. This dynamic relationship establishes an internal check on sovereign authority derived from the very premises that justify sovereignty in the first place.

Conclusion: From the English Civil War to the Iran-Israel Conflict

The parallels between the English Civil War that shaped Hobbes’s thinking and today’s Iran-Israel conflict illuminate the enduring relevance of his political theory. In both cases, we witness the paradox Hobbes identified: the very rights that define our humanity must be largely surrendered to secure their minimal protection, yet certain rights—particularly self-preservation—remain inalienable even in the most desperate circumstances. When Hobbes fled England in 1640 as Parliament challenged royal authority, he observed how competing claims to sovereignty unleashed violence that claimed 200,000 English lives. Towns changed hands repeatedly between Royalist and Parliamentary forces, leaving civilians caught between competing demands for loyalty and obedience. The religious sectarianism that fueled the conflict mirrors the ideological dimensions of modern Middle Eastern conflicts.

Today, as I sit and write in Canada, we see a similar pattern unfolding in Tehran and Tel Aviv. When Israel justifies its strikes as “necessary to roll back the Iranian threat” (CBS News, 2025a), it invokes the Hobbesian sovereign’s right to take measures for collective defense. Iranian civilians receiving evacuation warnings face the same dilemma as English villagers in contested territories during the 1640s: whether to obey their own sovereign who demands they stay, or to follow their natural right to self-preservation by fleeing.

For civilians in both 17th century England and 21st century Iran and Israel, Hobbes’s insights remain profoundly relevant. When Iranian citizens flee targeted areas despite government denials of attack severity, or when Israelis disregard official instructions to secure necessities during bombardment, they embody the principle that the right to self-preservation “can by no Covenant be relinquished.” The 224 Iranian casualties and 24 Israeli civilian deaths already reported demonstrate the persistent failure of sovereign protection that Hobbes identified as the condition that releases subjects from absolute obedience.

Nearly four centuries after Hobbes developed his theory amid civil war, his insights still illuminate the fundamental relationship between natural rights and sovereign protection. Neither Iran’s claims of defending sovereignty nor Israel’s invocation of preemptive security can justify arbitrary civilian sacrifice, just as neither Royalist claims of divine right nor Parliamentary appeals to representation could justify the suffering of English civilians in the 1640s. Hobbes’s framework, forged in the crucible of 17th century civil conflict, reminds us that civilian protection is not merely a humanitarian ideal but the very essence of legitimate political authority—a principle that leaders in both Tehran and Tel Aviv would do well to remember as they navigate this dangerous confrontation.

References

Anadolu Agency. (2025, June 14). Iran imposes nationwide internet restrictions in wake of Israeli attacks. Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-imposes-nationwide-internet-restrictions-in-wake-of-israeli-attacks/3597004

Associated Press. (2025, June 16). Iran missile attacks on Israel kill 8. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-missile-attacks-nuclear-news-06-16-2025-c98074e62ce5afd4c3f6d33edaffa069

CBS News. (2025a, June 15). Maps show where Israel attacked Iran, sites of Iranian nuclear program. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maps-israel-attacks-iran-nuclear-program/

Reuters. (2025a, June 16). Israeli air war on Iran: Tehran calls on Trump to seek ceasefire. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/israel-iran-battle-escalates-will-be-high-agenda-world-leaders-meet-2025-06-16/

Reuters. (2025b, June 16). Iran rejects ceasefire negotiations while under Israeli attack, official says. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-rejects-ceasefire-negotiations-while-under-israeli-attack-official-says-2025-06-15/

The Print. (2025, June 15). Amid escalation tensions, Israel says it ‘eliminated’ 9 Iranian nuclear scientists in strikes. Retrieved from https://theprint.in/world/amid-escalation-tensions-israel-says-it-eliminated-9-iranian-nuclear-scientists-in-strikes/2658150/

Washington Post. (2025, June 16). Live updates: Israel and Iran trade fire in broadening attacks on fourth day. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/16/israel-iran-attacks-live/